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Need Seen for Path Between Moralism and Retreatism

The central objective of our foreign policy must be to maintain the free world—to avert war, if possible, because war is the second greatest threat to freedom; but to be prepared for war, if necessary, because the greatest threat of all is totalitarian victory.

Generalities are easy; the problem is the reduction to detail. Here it becomes essential for us to recapture our poise, our clarity and our sense of realism—to succumb neither to an abstract moralism about foreign policy, which would tempt us into occupying positions beyond our power to support; nor to an unreasoning fear, which would frighten us into evacuating positions which, in fact, we can sustain.

Dangers of Abstract Moralism

The policy of abstract moralism has recently been in the ascendancy, both in Congress and in the press generally. The supporters of this policy argue that aggression has been committed by the Chinese Communists as well as by the North Koreans, and that the structure of international security requires that grand aggression be punished no less than petty aggression. To reward aggression, they say, by making concessions to the aggressors, as Nehru has urged, would be unthinkable: we must not only condemn Communist China but punish her—by sanctions or by aid to Chiang Kai-shek or by “limited war.”

The policy of unreasoning fear, on the other hand, would have us rapidly contract our overseas commitments, abandoning any attempt to station ground forces in what Mr. Hoover has called “the quick-

sands of China, India, or Western Europe.” If war should come, the United States should confine its armed aid to the free world to air and naval support.

Neither of these policies measures up

As its contribution to the “great debate,” the Foreign Policy Association has invited distinguished leaders of differing opinions to present their views on the course the United States should follow in world affairs. The fifth article in the series appears in the adjoining columns.

to the complex realities which confront us. The policy of abstract moralism is an honorable and high-minded policy; but it is so concerned with being right in the abstract that it forgets to be effective. If we had the power to chastise Communist China, we should clearly go ahead and do so; but to attempt to do so when we would surely fail (and let us not kid ourselves into thinking that Chiang, who could not contain the Communists when he held two-thirds of China, can now overthrow them from the island of Formosa) would involve us in a really serious loss of prestige and power. The function of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for moral indignation, however warranted that indignation may be. The function of foreign policy is to produce desired results.

As for the retreatist policy, if we follow this program, we abandon our allies, and, without allies, we can never hope to stem the tide of communism.

Between moralism and retreatism there lies, in my judgment, the possibility of a policy of realism. A realistic policy must start with the understanding that there is no short cut to peace or victory. We cannot devise propaganda of such diabolical effectiveness that the Russian people will arise and overthrow their masters; no amount of short-wave radio broadcasts or slogans will substitute for the hard, sustained work of supporting massive programs of rearmament and economic aid.

The next point of a realistic policy is an understanding of the indispensability of allies. This does not mean that the United States should surrender control over its foreign policy to a majority vote of the coalition of free nations. But it does mean that we must pay at least as much attention to our allies as we do to our ex-Presidents; it may at times mean that we must modify certain aspects of our policy to maintain our own leadership in the coalition.

Need for Allies

A recognition of the necessity of allies leads to two other conclusions: 1. Our allies have moments of concern that our policy may precipitate a war of which they will be the first victims. We must make clear to them that we think war still can be avoided; perhaps the best way so to reassure them is to keep the door open for negotiations with the U.S.S.R. (We must not, of course, delude them into thinking that peace is possible so long as Stalinism reigns in Russia; yet, while this is true, it is equally true that an armed truce or a cold war is to be pre-

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ferred to a hot war. The real function of negotiation is less to produce a change in Soviet policy than to confirm the mutual confidence and solidarity of the coalition of free nations.)

2. While military considerations must remain paramount until the free world has 50 divisions in Europe, we must never forget that our basic strength in the long pull comes from affirmative political, economic and moral action. The Marshall plan, the Gray report, Point Four—weapons like these must not be allowed to rust in our arsenal. To wield them effectively, to assert any kind of moral

leadership in the free world, we must combat within our own nation the disastrous tendencies toward McCarthyism and McCarranism, toward panic and despair.

Within this broad context, we should do several things in the next months:

1. begin the expansion of our Army to about 4 million men, committing divisions to Europe as speedily as we can;

2. work out with the free European nations a schedule of European rearmament, including Western Germany but giving that country a low priority;

3. issue a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia;

4. attempt to maintain our position in Korea;

5. develop a policy toward Communist China which will encourage rather than stifle any impulses on the part of Peiping toward independence from Moscow;

6. show no fear of entering a conference with the Russians;

7. extend UN authority to trouble-spots, such as Formosa and Indo-China.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

(Mr. Schlesinger, associate professor of history, Harvard University, is the author of many books, including *The Vital Center*, published in Boston by Houghton in 1949.)

Will West's Warnings Protect Yugoslavia?

A series of diplomatic moves in Washington, London and Belgrade has swung the world spotlight from Korea to Yugoslavia and the Eastern Mediterranean. The possibility that Yugoslavia might be attacked sometime in the spring indirectly by one or more of its neighbors—Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania—or directly by the U.S.S.R. has brought various intimations from Washington that any such move would be resisted by the United States.

Premier Stalin's statement that war is not inevitable "at least for the present"—published in *Pravda* and broadcast by the Moscow radio on February 16—has done little, if anything, to change the United States stand. Instead the State Department, publicly characterizing the statement as a sign of weakness in the Soviet world, appears to have been encouraged in its determination to aid Yugoslavia if attacked. Moreover, Marshal Tito's speech of February 17 indicates that he, too, is taking a bolder line, declaring Yugoslavia is prepared to resist any aggression in Europe, whether directed against his own state or against other nations.

Preventive Measures

On February 13 Assistant Secretary for European Affairs George W. Perkins visited Belgrade as a "tourist," according to his own description. Meanwhile, Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter and Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs George W. McGhee were making a survey of Turkey, which is slated to play a key role in defense of the Eastern Mediterranean in case of a Russian attack. On February 14, at a press conference, Secretary of State Acheson, when questioned about Washington's attitude on Yugoslavia, quoted

President Truman's July 19 message to Congress, in which the President declared that he was "sure that those who have it in their power to unleash or withhold acts of aggression must realize that new recourse to aggression in the world today might well strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace." This statement, according to Mr. Acheson, indicates the policy with which the Administration would react to aggression against Yugoslavia. Nor are the recent five atomic explosions in Nevada or the maneuvers of the United States Atlantic Fleet a mere coincidence in this connection. A cautious warning also came from Britain on February 15 when Minister of Labor Aneurin Bevan read a prepared statement in Commons expressing his government's concern over the "potential threat" to Yugoslavia. This declaration followed reports of Anglo-American consultations about potential military aid to Belgrade in an emergency.

These warnings will, it is hoped, prevent any move against Yugoslavia that might be contemplated by Moscow. Some observers have felt that had the United States in 1950 made clear its determination to defend South Korea against invasion from the north, instead of giving the impression that it had divested itself of responsibility for its future, the Russians would have hesitated to resort to force. An effort is now being made to avert recurrence of this situation by advance warnings, without, at the same time, going to the lengths of promising Marshal Tito specific aid which might involve the Western nations in a major war. What worries Washington most is that Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania—all former Axis satellites now in the Russian orbit—have been rearming far in

excess of the limits specified in the peace treaties; and the United States wants to place this issue on the agenda of the Big Four foreign ministers' conference. The session's agenda will be the subject of a preparatory meeting of their deputies in Paris early in March. Marshal Tito told Parliament on December 28 that the three nations' armies—including frontier guards, militarized labor battalions and air force personnel—totaled 660,000 men (273,500 only were permitted by the peace treaties). The Yugoslav army is estimated at 600,000 to 700,000 men.

Should West Help Tito?

Among the arguments advanced in the West against military aid to Yugoslavia is the fact, which is undeniable, that the present Belgrade government is Communist and is determined to remain Communist. Military aid to Tito, like the economic aid already given or contemplated by the United States and Britain, would constitute assistance to communism and thus represent a departure from previous American policy of opposing not only Russia but communism also. Those who favor aid to Belgrade contend—quite aside from any ideological considerations—that the West cannot afford to let Russia recapture a position of influence in so highly strategic an area; that the reintegration of Yugoslavia into the Russian orbit would gravely endanger the defense of Greece and Turkey; and that failure on the part of the Western powers and/or the United Nations to resist aggression against Yugoslavia would demoralize the rest of Europe and undermine the Atlantic coalition at the very start of its operation.

There is no question that Marshal Tito, while rejecting Stalinist doctrines and practices within Russia as well as abroad,

remains a firm supporter of Marxism as interpreted by Lenin. Industry, commerce and banking are publicly owned in Yugoslavia. Far from abandoning agricultural collectivization, Tito, in spite of growing peasant resentment, has intensified the drive for collective farming since his break with the Cominform in 1948. The Yugoslav Communists, however, to quote a London *Times* correspondent, "wear their Marxism with a difference." They are particularly determined to eradicate in Yugoslavia the defect they have vigorously denounced in Russia—and that is "bureaucratic centralism." In lieu of bureaucratic state ownership which, the Yugoslavs contend, stifles freedom and initiative, Tito is trying to evolve "higher" cooperative forms of socialism. (The Russian form is regarded as the lowest.) His measures include decentralizing adminis-

tration through the grant of greater authority to the governments of the six republics composing the Yugoslav Federation, the introduction of workers' councils in factories, and attempts to make the judiciary more independent of the executive.

In its effort to humanize communism, the Tito government has displayed a lively interest in the operation of the British administrative and economic system which, in its opinion, represents a high form of mature socialism. The Yugoslavs are also attentively watching the efforts of the German Social Democrats to introduce the practice of co-determination into the coal and steel industries of the Ruhr. In contrast to the Russian Communist leaders, the Yugoslav Communists show sympathy for, and a desire to learn from, the experience of Western European so-

cialism. As a result, friendly contacts have developed between Britain and Yugoslavia.

Nor do the Yugoslavs look with fear or hostility at the United States. The fundamental issue on which Tito defied Stalin and continues to defy him is Moscow's attempt, through communism, to dominate the Yugoslav nation and to dictate its course in both domestic and foreign affairs. As long as the Western powers scrupulously refrain from using economic aid or—should an emergency require it—military aid in order to steer Belgrade toward a given course or to impose on it a given political or economic pattern the prospects for increasingly friendly relations between Yugoslavia and the West appear decidedly favorable.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Korean War Tests Communist China's Pact with U.S.S.R.

Whatever the other reasons for Joseph Stalin's *Pravda* interview, published February 16, clearly urgent Chinese pressure growing out of the Korean situation was an important factor. Stalin declared that "if Britain and the United States reject finally the proposals made by the People's Government of China, the war in Korea can only end in a defeat of the interventionists." Does this imply that the Soviet Union will commit its own military resources to the Korean struggle now that the Chinese have been checked in their effort to achieve a quick victory in Korea?

If this interpretation is correct, Stalin's interview could represent a specific response to a personal appeal by Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Communists, who, according to rumor, may have gone to Moscow himself. Whether or not this rumor is correct, it is apparent that the Peiping government desperately needs help.

Heavy Chinese Losses

Even making allowances for errors in the Western reports that Chinese casualties amount to 600,000 so far, it is apparent that the Chinese Communists are suffering heavily. Independent reports transmitted through Hong Kong indicate that hospitals as far south as Hankow are jammed with soldiers. Although General Lin Piao's divisions in Korea total perhaps less than half a million men, as compared with the whole "People's Liberation Army" of about 5 million, they do constitute a large part of Peiping's best

trained, equipped and experienced troops. Not only are the heavy Korean losses imposing a serious drain on Peiping's military reserve, but they are also threatening to strengthen inflationary pressures which were apparently brought under control last year as the result of Herculean efforts.

From the outset the Chinese Communists have placed major stress on agrarian reform, economic development and the training of leaders. These goals received official expression in September 1949 in the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC). A year later at the meeting of the National Committee of the PPCC, Minister of Education Ma Hsu-lun declared that higher education must be linked with the needs of the nation's economic, political, cultural and national defense requirements, primarily serving economic construction. This stress on education corresponds to the traditional respect accorded by the Chinese to the scholar.

Under the impact of the Korean war situation, however, mass conscription has been instituted and heavy inroads have been made on the student population. According to a Peiping broadcast on January 22, a total of 250,000 youths—students and young workers—had enrolled in military cadre training academies during the last three weeks of 1950, the result of a high-pressure campaign for "volunteers" in all educational institutions. When this figure is compared with the total of 134,000 students registered in all

colleges and higher educational institutions as of May 1950, the seriousness of the situation may be gauged.

A mammoth propaganda campaign using the slogan, "Resist U.S. imperialism and assist the Korean people! Protect the fatherland and defend our homes!" has been sweeping the country. In a summary of conditions during the latter part of November, the *China Monthly Review* of Shanghai asserted, "Workers, students, government personnel, writers and artists carry the message—'Go to Korea, go to the front'—from house to house and street to street, on the trolleys and buses. And everywhere the entire city is talking about defending China."

War Psychology

War mobilization measures include curfews in big cities, the establishment of air defense headquarters, training of first-aid teams for use in case of bombing attacks, new restrictions on all movement. Beginning February 15 everyone entering or leaving Kwangtung province, adjoining Hong Kong, was required to carry an entrance or exit permit. New arrivals in any community must register with the police within 12 hours.

Observers of the China scene have heretofore commented on the apparent lack of coercion and violence in contrast to the use of police terrorism reported in the Soviet Union. Since the Korean war, however, there has been a severe security crackdown. Former Nationalist officials whose reliability has been questioned have

been arrested and interrogated, resulting in frequent executions, imprisonment, return to original homes under police surveillance, or assignment to hard labor on public works projects. The ranks of the Communist party itself are reportedly being subjected to a thorough scrutiny, beginning in January, with the intention of reducing the number of members to half of the present 6-million roll. Forced labor camps to handle the overflow from prisons have been established within the last two months.

This new repressive campaign supplements the struggle which has been going on for a longer time against organized guerrilla resistance. Premier Chou En-lai reported on September 30, 1950 that "at its peak the number of Kuomintang bandits reached more than one million, but after the resolute mopping-up actions of the People's Liberation Army . . . there are only about 200,000 left. During the past year 13,797 secret agents were arrested and 175 radio stations unearthed." Although Nationalist claims of 2 million potential guerrillas are undoubtedly exaggerated, open resistance continues. Lo Jui-ching, Communist security minister, in the January 1 issue of the official *People's Daily* declared that "our principal enemy today is not merely the handful of bandit Chiang remnants now in Formosa but criminal and cunning imperialism, particularly American imperialism, experienced in secret sabotage. Hence the future struggle against secret agents will become more invisible, more complicated, more sharp and more violent."

Meanwhile, in pressing its land redistribution programs in the more than half of the country which constitutes the "newly liberated areas," the regime has encountered opposition not only from landlords but also from some peasants. Hankow's official *Yangtze Daily* recently found it necessary to admonish overzealous political workers who used "rough measures" against peasants suspected of concealing landlords' property, thereby "scaring" them and causing "certain backward peasants" to commit suicide. Similar restraint, however, has not been urged in dealing with the "landlord class" which is being "liquidated as a

whole." Recalcitrant landlords, as reported to *The New York Times* from Hong Kong by Henry R. Lieberman on February 13, have been subjected to ruthless treatment including torture.

Under wartime pressure, the emphasis has shifted from reform to increased production. The East China Military and Administrative Committee on February 2 in a ten-point program called on landlords to "take part in production in order to avoid waste of land." Peasants are to "develop mutual aid in the villages," a form of collective endeavor on farm tasks. Model laborers are to be encouraged and scientific knowledge popularized. The land and property allotted to farmers must be protected and peasants producing more output than the quota estimated for their land will not have additional levies imposed on the surplus output, according to the provisions of the ten-point program.

The Chinese Communists, under the impact of the Korean crisis, have therefore found it necessary to resort to Draconian measures. There can be little doubt that the Peiping authorities are discussing their problems with Moscow. Will Stalin be able to satisfy Mao's needs? And what special problems and opportunities for American policy toward China have been created by these developments?

FRED W. RIGGS

(The first of two articles on recent developments in China.)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

CLEVELAND, February 26, *Is the British Empire Breaking Up?*, Patrick Monkhouse

MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL, February 26, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brook Hays, Walter Judd

NEW ORLEANS, February 26, *Strategic Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emery

DETROIT, February 27, *ECA*, John P. Dawson

BOSTON, March 1, *Has British Socialism Been a Success?*, James W. Wyers, Eric A. Wright

BUFFALO, March 1, *Germany*, Telford Taylor, Edward Litchfield

MILWAUKEE, March 1, Off-the-Record Luncheon, Joseph E. Johnson

SHREVEPORT, March 1, *Strategic Frontiers of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Brooks Emery

LYNN, March 5, *The Administrators of American Aid in Europe*, Alfred E. Chase

DETROIT, March 6, *Point Four*, Alfred H. Kelly

ELMIRA, March 6, *Turkey, the Near East and American Foreign Policy*, Nuri Eren

DETROIT, March 8, *The Problems of Latin American Countries*, Phillip Wernette

News in the Making

UN EXPLORES SANCTIONS: The UN committee set up to explore the possibility of sanctions against Communist China commenced work on February 16. Reduced to 12 members by the refusal of Burma and Yugoslavia to participate, the UN unit handed delegates from Turkey, Belgium and Australia the job of suggesting future action. Trade restrictions and a ban on new recognitions of Communist China are but a few of the possibilities that will be discussed.

SNAGS IN COLOMBO PLAN: The current meetings in Ceylon of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee reveal that it may not be easy to extend the Colombo plan of economic development to all Asian nations. Non-Commonwealth nations—Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Indo-Chinese states of Cambodia and Vietnam—seem reluctant to join the plan unless given assurance that their participation will result in increased American aid. The United States delegate to the meetings, Donald R. Kennedy of the State Department, has not raised hopes beyond saying the United States is "keenly interested" in developing the non-Communist nations of Asia.

NEW CABINET IN VIETNAM: A month-long attempt to set up a new cabinet for the Bao Dai government of Vietnam came to a successful conclusion on February 18. The new cabinet differs from its predecessor mostly in personalities and the number of ministries, rather than in political character. Catholic groups have refused offers of representation because they feel the government is too pro-French and lacks clearly defined powers.

POLITICAL TEST FOR ISRAEL: New elections appeared likely in Israel after the fall of the government led by David Ben-Gurion on February 14. Mr. Ben-Gurion's defeat resulted from a test in the Knesset on the issue of religious education. The Religious bloc, which pressed the question, won the support of other parties in the coalition government, isolating Mr. Ben-Gurion's moderate socialist Mapai party and winning a 49-to-42 parliamentary victory.

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